











Jordan hosts large numbers of refugees from Palestine, Syria and Iraq, as well as from other countries such as Sudan, Somalia and Yemen. The resulting increase in population has put pressure on local infrastructure and services. The unemployment rate among Jordanians has increased since the influx of Syrian refugees, leading to tensions between refugee and host communities over competition for jobs.

This country profile is based on the analysis of security incidents and concerns shared by nine aid agencies through the Aid in Danger project. It provides a unique insight into the environment in which aid agencies work.¹

Reported concerns affecting aid delivery in Jordan

-  • **Crime:** Violent crime – sexual violence. Petty crime – burglaries, extortion, fraud, thefts, vehicle break-ins, vandalism.
-  • **Operational space:** Arrests and detentions of NGO staff members; armed groups' presence at aid distributions; surveillance.
-  • **Killed, injured, kidnapped (KIK):** Two NGO staff member assaulted and one injured since January 2015.
-  • **RTAs:** 31% of all reported road traffic accident (RTA) incidents caused NGO staff injuries.
-  • **Weapons use:** 21% of NGO-related security incidents involved weapons use.²

No particular changes to the country-typical patterns have been identified in recent months (October-December 2017).

-  • Few incidents were reported since October 2017.
-  • The main threats continue to be linked to **crime, operational space** and **RTAs**.
-  • One NGO staff member experienced a minor assault since October 2017.

¹All decisions made on the basis of or with consideration to such information remain the responsibility of the organisations taking such decisions. Staff are advised to secure travel briefings prior to travel.


²Weapons use reported during 15 incidents related to conflict, aid delivery distribution, operational space and terrorism. Weapons were used in 100% of terrorism incidents; 100% of conflict-related incidents; 80% of KIK incidents; 40% of aid delivery distribution incidents; and 17% of operational space-related incidents.

Long-term threat patterns and recent changes

Based on data for January 2015-December 2017

Long-term threat patterns, January 2015-September 2017

A high number of incidents were criminally motivated, including burglaries and thefts. Next highest were operational space-related incidents and RTAs.



Aid delivery disruption: Mostly by beneficiaries and locals during aid distributions.

Conflict: All incidents related to the conflict in Syria and led to security measures being implemented by agencies.

Crime: Violent crime – sexual violence. Petty crime – burglaries, extortion, fraud, thefts, vehicle break-ins, and vandalism.

KIK: Erbid governorate and Amman (see [KIK](#) on p. 8 for further details).

Operational space: Arrests and detentions of NGO staff members; armed groups’ presence at aid distributions; surveillance.

RTAs: 64% of reported RTA incidents did not cause NGO staff injuries.


Sexual violence: From NGO security guard, contracted driver and local males (see [Sexual violence](#) on p. 6 for further details).

Terrorism: Security measures taken after SVIED and other IED attacks (see [Terrorism](#) on p. 7 for further details).

Unrest: Demonstrations.

Recent concerns affecting aid delivery, October-December 2017

Few incidents have been reported since October 2017. Most recent incidents reflected Jordan’s country-specific patterns, with reports of RTAs and criminally motivated incidents that affected aid workers and NGO assets.



Aid delivery disruption: No incidents identified.

Conflict: No incidents identified.

Crime: Robberies and thefts.

KIK: Minor assault on NGO staff member.

Operational space: Threat made against NGO; no further details available.

Road traffic accidents: No NGO staff member deaths or injuries reported.

Sexual violence: No incidents identified.

Terrorism: No incidents identified.

Unrest: Unspecified armed activity.



Crime: Violent crime – sexual violence. Petty crime – burglaries, extortion, fraud, thefts, vehicle break-ins, and vandalism.



- The Jordanian Office for National Statistics reports a steady rise in petty and violent crimes in the last five years.
- This is largely motivated by increased income inequality, high unemployment rates and a growing belief that the law is not applied evenly.
- Credit card skimming is a common criminal practice.
- Women may face risks associated with harassment, unwanted sexual advances and petty crime.



- Amman, Zarqa and Irbid reported the largest rise in crime.



- Agency-reported crime incidents included actual and attempted burglaries, extortion, fraud, sexual violence (see [Sexual violence](#) on p. 6 for further information), thefts, vehicle break-ins, and vandalism.

Type of location



- **NGO offices:** Half of crime incidents occurred at NGO offices: cash stolen from cash box; fraudulent activity and extortion attempts by NGO staff members; property damage.
- **Roads:** All reported sexual violence-related incidents occurred at the roadside. Attempted night-time street robbery of female NGO international staff member by male near Retaj Hotel (Amman); staff relocated to another hotel.
- **Residences:** Actual and attempted thefts.
- **Project sites:** Burglaries and thefts; NGO logo vandalised; property damage.
- **Vehicles:** Personal vehicle broken into: NGO and personal assets taken.



Weapons use in crime incidents

- **Unarmed:** No crime incidents were reported where the perpetrators were armed.

Aid in Danger project reported locations





Operational space: Arrests and detentions of NGO staff members; armed groups' presence at aid distributions; surveillance.



- Access to cross-border camps from Jordan can be a contentious issue, because the government maintains limitations on freedom of movement and access due to ongoing insecurity posed by Islamic State (IS) and other groups.
- Armed groups fighting in the conflict in Syria are reportedly active in IDP camps.



- Over half of operational space incidents reported NGO staff member arrests or detentions at airport immigration, during random documentation checks and following RTAs (see [RTA's](#) on p. 5 for further details). In addition:
- Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters took over crowd control measures at aid distributions following approval by the Jordanian security forces. During one distribution FSA fighters fired shots into the air, after which security forces asked all NGOs to leave the site; no NGO staff member deaths, injuries or damage to NGO property were reported (2016-06).
- Following an IS-claimed VBIED attack in Baqqa, authorities blocked food deliveries and restricted water deliveries to the camp (2016-03).
- Three armoured vehicles and police special forces surrounded and then entered a restaurant, pointed shotguns and automatic rifles at 17 NGO staff members, and forced them to kneel with their heads down. No NGO staff member deaths or injuries were reported (2016-11).
- Aggressive behaviour was reported by unidentified persons in a vehicle towards NGO staff members in an NGO vehicle; they shouted that the NGO was not welcome (2016-11).
- Threats and intimidation were directed at NGO staff members by fellow staff members and disgruntled drivers.



Aid delivery disruption: By beneficiaries and locals during aid distributions.



- Jordan is experiencing increasing unemployment levels and a massive influx of Syrian refugees.
- Approximately 50,000 Syrian refugees are reportedly stranded at the berm (a narrow strip of land on the Jordan-Syria border) in settlements along the Hadalat and Rukban border crossings.
- Unemployment rates among Jordanians have increased since the influx of Syrian refugees.
- Unrest among refugees is common and fighting with border security forces is often reported



- An NGO national volunteer was harassed by the local population over aid activities in Zarqa governorate, and a beneficiary threatened a male NGO national staff member.
- Food distribution was suspended after beneficiaries threw stones at border security forces in Rukban, who responded with tear gas (2016-03).

Long-term threat patterns and recent changes

Based on data for January 2015-December 2017



Road traffic accidents (RTAs): Landmines, dangerous driving practices, border closures.



- There has been a slight upward trend in the number of national RTAs; fatality rates are high throughout the country.
- Off-road driving can be hazardous due to minefields. Most are fenced off and signposted; however, these protective measures are not always properly maintained. Landmines tend to be located within a two-mile radius of military installations and border regions.
- Dangerous driving practices are common: excessive speeding, failure to obey traffic regulations, driving at night without headlights, road rage.
- There are temporary road and/or border closures, sometimes without notice, due to armed clashes, militant activity, mortar fire (in the areas bordering Syria and Iraq) and/or bad weather.
- The Trebil border crossing (Jordan-Iraq border) and Nasib border crossing (Jordan-Syria border) are commonly closed due to insecurity.
- Rural roads sometimes lack adequate lighting and road markings, while livestock, camels and pedestrians frequently walk on or cross roads.




- The 205-mile (330-km) Highway 15, also known as the Desert Highway, linking Amman and Aqaba can be dangerous: it is narrow and steep, with poorly delineated lanes and inadequate lighting.



- 13 vehicle aid-worker-related road traffic incidents were identified by the Aid in Danger project.
- 31% of reported RTA incidents caused NGO staff injuries.
- There were no reports of RTAs causing NGO staff member deaths.
- A contracted truck driver suffered burns when unloading supplies after another driver threw a lit cigarette into the contracted driver's truck.
- Two RTAs reportedly caused injuries to a child and an adult.
- One incident was reported of an RTA caused by a sand storm.
- In five incidents traffic police responded to the accident. Following on-site investigations, four RTAs were referred to court, one due to the non-NGO driver not having legal registration documents or insurance. These five incidents all involved NGO staff member or civilian injuries.

Aid in Danger project-reported locations of RTAs



Aid in Danger project-identified RTA incidents, by year

	2015	2016	2017
Fatal injuries	0	0	0
Major injuries	0	0	0
Minor injuries	0	2	2
No injuries	2	4	3
Total incidents per year	2	6	5



Sexual violence: From NGO security guard, contracted driver and local males.

- Seven NGO staff members reported aggressive sexual behaviour.
- 80% of incidents were reported in Amman while staff members were standing or walking in the street.
- Perpetrators include an NGO security guard, a contracted driver and local males.



Conflict: Involving armed groups and beneficiaries during aid distributions.



- Security in the border areas remains unpredictable due to the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.
- Frequent military activity, including shelling and gunfire, has resulted in several civilian fatalities and injuries on the Jordanian side of the border with Syria.



- No incidents were identified that involved staff deaths and injuries or NGO property damage during conflict-related incidents between January 2015 and December 2017.
- However, several NGOs took security measures to protect staff, assets, and programmes in Irbid governorate due to conflict-related events in Syria:
 - Rocket fire by pro-Syrian regime forces (2016-02).
 - Frequent daily clashes between the Syrian army, Hezbollah forces, and Russian forces against the Free Syrian Army in Daraa, 12 km from the border (2016-02).
 - The Jordanian air force conducted aerial bombing along the border areas (2015-11).
 - Mortar shells of an unspecified origin exploded near a project site (2015-03).



Terrorism: IEDs targeting cafés, restaurants, military posts, refugee camps and tourist attractions.



- The threat of terrorism is high: local, regional and transnational terrorist groups/extremists have demonstrated their willingness and capacity to plan and execute attacks.
- Authorities continue to disrupt terrorist plots; however, Islamist groups are growing in numbers and becoming increasingly violent.
- Jordan is reportedly home to an estimated 6,000-7,000 jihadi sympathisers. Traditionally, they have supported the Hashemite monarchy in exchange for jobs; however, rising unemployment rates have cultivated jihadist sympathies among some younger members of society.
- Returning fighters from the Syrian and Iraqi conflict zones who are weapons trained and ideologically indoctrinated pose additional concerns.



- Previous targets include cafés, restaurants, military posts, refugee camps and tourist attractions.
- Attacks have occurred during religious holidays and after Friday prayers; however, they can also occur at random.

ISIS

- ISIS frequently calls on Jordanians to attack foreigners, especially in tourist hotspots such as Petra.
- The December 2016 attack at Karak Castle was the first civilian-targeted attack in Jordan for almost a decade.
- In May 2017 a double VBIED attack on the Rukban refugee camp killed at least six people.



- No incidents were identified that involved staff deaths and injuries during terrorism-related incidents involving IS militants between January 2015 and December 2017.
- However, several NGOs took security measures to protect staff, assets and programmes after IS-claimed attacks, including VBIEDs attacks on military posts near the Rukban and Hadalat refugee camps and at Baqqa Palestinian refugee camp. Following the attack at the Baqqa camp, authorities blocked food deliveries and restricted water deliveries to the camp. Security advisories were issued after the Karak Castle attack.

Other groups

- National and transnational groups include Jaish Ahrar al-Ashair, which is believed to be active in IDP camps, and the Takfiri-Salafi Group (Jordan), also known as the Abu Sayyaf Group in Jordan.



- No incidents were identified that involved staff deaths and injuries during terrorism-related incidents involving non-IS extremist groups between January 2015 and December 2017.
- However, security measures were taken to protect staff, assets and programmes following four terrorism-related incidents involving non-IS extremist groups. All were reported in Irbid governorate. Security forces conducted raids on extremists who were allegedly preparing terrorist attacks in Irbid refugee camp and at residential properties, and an explosion of unspecified origin occurred close to an NGO office.



Unrest: Demonstrations and ethnic/tribal unrest.



- The escalation of the humanitarian crisis in Syria and the ensuing conflict in Iraq has contributed to Jordan's socio-economic and security-related challenges.
- Government resources are strained and public grievances are growing, fuelled by government policies, domestic and regional developments, economic issues (unemployment and low wages), and local grievances (access to water, government services).

Demonstrations

- Protests have occurred in response to violence in the West Bank and Gaza.
- The US government's recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital led to numerous demonstrations outside the US embassy in Amman.
- Protests commonly occur after Friday prayers; however, they can also occur at random.
- Ongoing unrest in Ma'an since April 2014 could close the Desert Highway due to large demonstrations and violence in the area.
- Rocks and/or burning tires are commonly used to block roadways during times of unrest. Unrest occurred in:



- Amman, in areas near large mosques, ministries, diplomatic missions, and major road intersections.
- Irbid, Zarqa, Mafraq, Madaba, Karak, Tafileh, Ma'an, Ajloun and Salt, as well as along the major highways connecting these towns.



- All reported unrest-related incidents were due to demonstrations: 60% of these led to security measures being taken to protect NGO staff, assets and programmes.
- No incidents were identified between January 2015 and December 2017 that involved staff deaths and injuries during unrest-related incidents.

Ethnic/tribal unrest

- Clashes between feuding clans periodically erupt and sometimes involve an escalation in violence, including firearms use.
- Security services can be slow to respond or opt to let the violence subside before intervening.
- Road closures to contain the violence are common.



- No unrest-related incidents were identified that were due to ethnic/tribal unrest.



Reported KIK incidents (3)

The table below lists KIK incidents reported between January 2016 and December 2017. KIK incidents are any incidents that resulted in a staff member being killed, injured or kidnapped. KIK includes beaten, kidnapped, killed, missing, tortured, and wounded.

2017-12	Mafraq governorate	Minor assault on NGO staff member. No further information available.
2017-07	Erbid governorate	Contracted driver suffered burns when unloading supplies after another driver threw a lit cigarette into the contracted driver's truck.
2016-03	Amman	NGO cleaner experienced minor assault by male who was harassing a fellow staff member.

Weapons use in KIK incidents



- 0% of KIK incidents involved weapons use.